

A Simple Mathematical Model for Analysing Vote Shares in the Assembly Election in West Bengal in 2026 Following Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

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Abstract

This paper presents a simple mathematical model to analyse the impact of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls on the vote shares of AITC, BJP & Others in the 2026 West Bengal Assembly Election. Nearly 0.91 crore ineligible voters were deleted from the electoral rolls by the Election Commission of India (ECI). Using the results of 2024 Lok Sabha Election in West Bengal, this model examines how the removal of voters and the anti-incumbency effects may have influenced the results of the 2026 Assembly Election. The model defines key parameters representing the turnout percentage of ineligible voters, the percentage of their votes in favour of AITC (with the remaining in favour of BJP), and the percentage of votes that shifted from AITC and Others to BJP due to anti-incumbency. By solving a system of equations, this study identifies combinations of these parameters that reproduce the observed results of the 2026 West Bengal Assembly Election. The analysis shows that the observed vote shares are consistent with the model under various plausible assumptions regarding voter behaviour. This model suggests that, if SIR had not been conducted, AITC would have received a higher vote share than BJP in 2026 if the anti-incumbency swing was less than about 6.61%. This study further indicates that, for the observed 2026 election results to be reproduced by the model, the anti-incumbency swing from AITC and Others to BJP must be at least about 6.8%. An analysis involving different combinations of parameter values highlights how electoral roll revisions may meaningfully influence results in close contests. For simplicity, the present study uses only state-wide aggregate data. A limitation is that the constituency-wise information has not been used. The findings demonstrate the usefulness of simple mathematical modelling in understanding the effects of administrative decisions on election outcomes.

Keywords: Special Intensive Revision (SIR), Electoral Rolls, West Bengal Assembly Election, Vote Share, Anti-incumbency, Voter Turnout, Electoral Roll Revision, Sensitivity Analysis, Electoral Reform, Ineligible Voters, Impact of SIR, Mathematical Modelling.

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1. Introduction

The Election Commission of India (ECI) conducted an exercise named Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in several states, including West Bengal, during 2025-26, ahead of the Assembly Elections [1-4]. This exercise was aimed at cleaning the voter lists by removing ineligible entries under categories such as Absent, Shifted, Deceased, and Duplicate (ASDD) as well as those with Logical Discrepancies, with the process also generating wider legal and constitutional debate regarding electoral integrity and voter verification in India [5]. At the initiation of the SIR process, enumeration forms were issued to approximately 7.66 crore electors in West Bengal [6]. Nearly 0.91 crore names were deleted from the electoral rolls, reducing the number of electors from approximately 7.66 crore (pre-SIR) to around 6.80 crore after the revision and addition of nearly 0.05 crore (5 lakh) new voters (obtained as $7.66 - 0.91 + 0.05 = 6.80$ crore) [1, 6–11].

To analyse the impact of the SIR on the results of the 2026 West Bengal Assembly Election, the present study uses the results of the 2024 Lok Sabha Election in the state as the baseline. In the 2024 Lok Sabha polls, West Bengal had nearly 7.60 crore registered voters with a turnout of nearly 79.59% [12, 13]. All India Trinamool Congress (AITC) secured 46.16% of votes, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) obtained 39.08%, while the remaining 14.76% votes went to other parties and independents [12, 13]. In this article, all political parties other than the two main parties (AITC, BJP) are collectively denoted by the term ‘Others’.

In 2026, the Assembly Election in West Bengal was held in two phases in the month of April. It had a voter turnout of 92.47%, where the final vote shares were approximately 40.80% for AITC, 45.84% for BJP, and 13.36% for Others [14-16]. This shift in vote shares, along with the significant deletion of voters, has generated interest in understanding the quantitative effect of the electoral roll revision on the election outcome.

This paper presents a simple mathematical model to examine the possible impact of the SIR. The model incorporates parameters for the turnout and voting preferences of the deleted voters as well as the anti-incumbency swing from AITC and Others towards the main opposition (BJP). By varying these parameters, the study assesses the sensitivity of the results to different assumptions regarding the voters. Such modelling exercises are useful in evaluating the role of administrative measures like voter list revisions in electoral outcomes and contribute to the broader discourse on electoral reforms in India [3, 17].

2. Mathematical Formulation

To examine the impact of the SIR on the results of the 2026 election, let us define a variable, denoted by I , representing the number of voters (in crores) found ineligible in the SIR. Although its value is nearly 0.91 crore, it has been kept as a variable quantity in our model to find the dependence of the results upon this variable. For example, to estimate the results assuming SIR has not taken place, one needs to set $I = 0$. Assuming, for simplicity, that the proportion of ineligible voters remains constant across elections, the number of ineligible voters in 2024 can be taken to be $7.60 I / 7.66$, since I is the number of ineligible voters among

7.66 crore registered voters (pre-SIR). The number of eligible voters in 2024 was, therefore, $7.60 - \frac{7.60}{7.66}I$.

Nearly 79.59% of the 7.60 crore electors had participated in the voting process in West Bengal in the Lok Sabha Election held in 2024 [12, 13]. The numbers of votes obtained by AITC, BJP and Others were nearly 46.16%, 39.08% and 14.76%, respectively, of the total votes cast (which was 79.59% of 7.60 crore) [12, 13].

Let f be the voter-turnout percentage for the ineligible voters in 2024. Let us assume that $x\%$ of their votes were cast in favour of AITC and $(100 - x)\%$ were in favour of the BJP. This is based on an assumption that all the votes cast by the ineligible voters were in favour of the two main political parties, who secured the highest number of votes (their combined votes being more than 85% of the votes cast).

Thus, the numbers of votes (in crores) cast by the eligible voters in favour of AITC, BJP and Others in 2024 (denoted respectively by the symbols T_1 , B_1 , O_1 here) are given below.

$$T_1 = \left(\frac{46.16}{100} \frac{79.59}{100} \times 7.60 - \frac{x}{100} \frac{f}{100} \frac{7.60}{7.66} I \right) \quad (1)$$

$$B_1 = \left(\frac{39.08}{100} \frac{79.59}{100} \times 7.60 - \frac{100-x}{100} \frac{f}{100} \frac{7.60}{7.66} I \right) \quad (2)$$

$$O_1 = \frac{14.76}{100} \frac{79.59}{100} \times 7.60 \quad (3)$$

The number of votes cast by the eligible voters in 2024 (denoted here by N_E) is the sum of the above three quantities, which is given by,

$$N_E = T_1 + B_1 + O_1 = (6.04884 - 0.009922 fI) \quad (4)$$

If the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) had been carried out by the ECI in West Bengal before the 2024 Lok Sabha Election, causing a deletion of names of ineligible voters whose number was $7.60 I/7.66$ (based on proportionality), the probable numbers of votes for AITC, BJP & Others would have been T_1 , B_1 , O_1 respectively. The corresponding vote share percentages would be, respectively, $T_1\% = 100 T_1/N_E$, $B_1\% = 100 B_1/N_E$ and $O_1\% = 100 O_1/N_E$.

The number of registered voters in West Bengal increased from 7.6 crore in 2024 to 7.66 crore in 2025 (pre-SIR base) [6, 12, 13]. The names of nearly 0.91 crore voters were deleted as a result of the SIR, and nearly 0.05 crore new names were added in 2026, leading the total number of voters to around 6.80 crore (post-SIR) who were eligible to vote in the Assembly Election held in West Bengal in 2026 [7, 8, 10, 11].

In terms of the symbol I , denoting the number of voters deleted (in crores) in SIR, the total number of voters becomes $(7.66 + 0.05 - I)$ i.e., $(7.71 - I)$. About 92.47% of these voters have cast their votes in the Assembly Election held in West Bengal in 2026 [13-15]. Thus, $\left[\frac{92.47}{100} (7.71 - I) \right]$ crore votes were cast in 2026.

To have an initial estimate of the numbers of voters of AITC, BJP and Others in the 2026 election, we propose to calculate three quantities, denoted by T_2 , B_2 , and O_2 respectively, having the same ratio as T_1 , B_1 , O_1 , and, subject to the constraint that their sum ($T_2 + B_2 + O_2$) equals $\frac{92.47}{100}(7.71 - I)$. Based on this logic, their values (in crores) are expressed as,

$$T_2 = \frac{T_1}{N_E} \times \left[\frac{92.47}{100} (7.71 - I) \right] \tag{5}$$

$$B_2 = \frac{B_1}{N_E} \times \left[\frac{92.47}{100} (7.71 - I) \right] \tag{6}$$

$$O_2 = \frac{O_1}{N_E} \times \left[\frac{92.47}{100} (7.71 - I) \right] \tag{7}$$

where, $N_E = T_1 + B_1 + O_1$.

Based on these numbers (T_2 , B_2 , and O_2), one may calculate the final counts (denoted here by T_3 , B_3 and O_3) by taking into consideration an anti-incumbency effect which may cause a shift of votes from AITC+Others (i.e., $T_2 + O_2$) to the BJP which was the main opposition party in the legislative assembly of West Bengal during the period from 2021 to 2026, as evident from the results of 2021 Assembly Election [18-20]. To address this effect in our model, let $y\%$ of the sum ($T_2 + O_2$) be added to B_2 to get the number of votes obtained by the BJP in the 2026 Assembly Election. The numbers of votes (in crores) for the three blocs (i.e., AITC, BJP & Others) in the same election, after incorporating the anti-incumbency shift, may thus be expressed as,

$$T_3 = T_2 \left(1 - \frac{y}{100} \right) \tag{8}$$

$$B_3 = B_2 + \frac{y}{100} (T_2 + O_2) \tag{9}$$

$$O_3 = O_2 \left(1 - \frac{y}{100} \right) \tag{10}$$

One can easily verify that, $T_3 + B_3 + O_3 = T_2 + B_2 + O_2$

Combining equations (1) – (10), one obtains,

$$T_3 = A(a - kxfI)(1 - 0.01y) \tag{11}$$

$$B_3 = A[b - k(100 - x)fl + 0.01y(a + c - kxfI)] \tag{12}$$

$$O_3 = Ac(1 - 0.01y) \tag{13}$$

where, $A = \frac{0.9247(7.71-I)}{6.04883964-0.0099216703fl}$, $a = 2.792144544$, $b = 2.363886312$,

$c = 0.892808784$, $k = 0.000099216703$.

In the Assembly Election held in West Bengal in 2026, nearly 92.47% of the 6.80 crore electors participated in the voting process. The numbers of votes obtained by AITC, BJP and Others

were nearly 40.80%, 45.84% and 13.36%, respectively, of the total number of votes cast (which was 92.47% of 6.80 crore). Substituting these data into equations (11) – (13), one gets,

$$A(a - kxfI)(1 - 0.01y) = \frac{40.80}{100} \frac{92.47}{100} \times 6.8 \tag{14}$$

$$A[b - k(100 - x)fI + 0.01y(a + c - kxfI)] = \frac{45.84}{100} \frac{92.47}{100} \times 6.8 \tag{15}$$

$$Ac(1 - 0.01y) = \frac{13.36}{100} \frac{92.47}{100} \times 6.8 \tag{16}$$

3. Results and Discussion

For $I = 0.91$ (which was the number of voters, in crores, deleted in the SIR), we have determined the values of x and y , using equations (14) – (16), for a range of values of the parameter f , from 0 to 100. These values are listed in Table-1.

TABLE – 1

Values of x and y for different values of f for $I = 0.91$					
f	x	y	f	x	y
(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
0	no value	11.61	55	13.21	16.92
5	145.32	10.16	60	12.11	17.59
10	72.66	10.84	65	11.18	18.27
15	48.44	11.51	70	10.38	18.94
20	36.33	12.19	75	9.69	19.62
25	29.06	12.86	80	9.08	20.29
30	24.22	13.54	85	8.55	20.97
35	20.76	14.21	90	8.07	21.64
40	18.17	14.89	95	7.65	22.32
45	16.15	15.56	100	7.27	23.00
50	14.53	16.24	–	–	–

Two entries in Table-1 are marked in red. In the first row we have $f = 0$, which represents zero participation of the ineligible voters in the voting process. Therefore, there cannot be any value of x , since x is the percentage of ineligible participants who had cast their votes in favour

of AITC in 2024. For $f = 5$, one gets $x = 145.32$, which is not an acceptable value because x represents percentage by definition.

As per Table-1, the highest and the lowest physically admissible values of x are 72.66 and 7.27, corresponding to $f = 10$ and $f = 100$ respectively. For these two possibilities, the values of y are 10.84 and 23.00 respectively, which represent the percentages of votes shifted from AITC and Others to the BJP.

For any of the combinations of f and x , listed in Table-1, one can calculate T_1 , B_1 and O_1 , using equations (1) – (3). As mentioned earlier, their values are the probable numbers of votes that would have been obtained by three blocs - AITC, BJP & Others, respectively, in West Bengal in the 2024 Lok Sabha Election, if the SIR had been carried out prior to that election causing a deletion of ineligible voters. Table-2 shows their probable vote-share percentages for five combinations of f and x chosen from Table-1.

TABLE – 2

Probable vote shares (%) of AITC, BJP & Others in West Bengal in the 2024 Lok Sabha Election, if SIR had been conducted prior to the election					
	$f = 10,$ $x = 72.66$	$f = 35,$ $x = 20.76$	$f = 55,$ $x = 13.21$	$f = 75,$ $x = 9.69$	$f = 100,$ $x = 7.27$
$T_1\%$	45.76	47.56	49.11	50.76	52.98
$B_1\%$	39.26	36.87	34.81	32.62	29.67
$O_1\%$	14.98	15.57	16.08	16.62	17.35

Table-3 shows the probable vote shares of AITC, BJP & Others in the 2026 Assembly Election in West Bengal, if the SIR had not been carried out. It is shown here for five values of y which represents the percentage of votes of AITC & Others that has shifted to the BJP.

No SIR means $I = 0$ in our model. For $I = 0$, T_3 , B_3 and O_3 depend only upon y as per equations (11) – (13). It is found that, for $I = 0$, AITC obtains greater vote share than the BJP if $y < 6.61$.

TABLE – 3

Probable vote shares (%) of AITC, BJP & Others in the Assembly Election in West Bengal in 2026, without SIR (i.e., $I = 0$), for different vote swing percentages (y)					
	$y = 0$	$y = 5$	$y = 10$	$y = 15$	$y = 20$
$T_3\%$	46.16	43.85	41.55	39.24	36.93
$B_3\%$	39.08	42.13	45.17	48.22	51.26

$O_3\%$	14.76	14.02	13.28	12.54	11.81
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Using equations (14) – (16), for $I = 0.91$ (the number of ineligible voters in crores) and $y = 0$ (zero anti-incumbency swing percentage), one gets, $f < 0$, $x < 0$, which are inadmissible because they represent percentages. Numerical solution of equations (14) – (16) indicates that approximately $y \geq 6.8$ is required for $I = 0.91$ to obtain physically admissible (positive) values of f and x . It implies that without a vote swing of at least 6.8% from AITC+Others to BJP, the observed vote shares of AITC, BJP and Others of the 2026 Assembly Election in West Bengal would not have been possible.

In this study, we have examined the effect of variation of the parameter I (denoting the number of voters, in crores, declared ineligible in the SIR) upon the vote shares of the two main political parties (AITC and BJP) of West Bengal. The ratio of the number of votes obtained by AITC to the votes obtained by BJP (i.e., T_3/B_3) has been calculated for different combinations of x and I , for $f = 50$. Tables – 4, 5, 6 show these values for three different vote-swing percentages, represented by $y = 0, 5, 10$ respectively.

TABLE – 4

Values of T_3/B_3 for $f = 50$, $y = 0$ (with varying x, I)					
I	$x = 0$	$x = 25$	$x = 50$	$x = 75$	$x = 100$
0.00	1.1812	1.1812	1.1812	1.1812	1.1812
0.25	1.2466	1.2159	1.1860	1.1570	1.1287
0.50	1.3196	1.2536	1.1912	1.1322	1.0762
0.75	1.4018	1.2946	1.1966	1.1067	1.0238
1.00	1.4949	1.3395	1.2024	1.0805	0.9713
1.25	1.6012	1.3888	1.2085	1.0535	0.9188
1.50	1.7238	1.4432	1.2150	1.0258	0.8664
1.75	1.8667	1.5035	1.2219	0.9973	0.8139
2.00	2.0355	1.5707	1.2293	0.9679	0.7614
2.25	2.2378	1.6460	1.2372	0.9377	0.7090

The case of $I = 0$ means that the SIR has not been conducted. Thus, there should be no effect of any change of x upon T_3 , B_3 and O_3 if $I = 0$, as per equations (11) – (13) because these equations become independent of x if we set $I = 0$. The values of the ratio T_3/B_3 in different columns corresponding to $I = 0$ are the same in each of the Tables – 4, 5, 6.

TABLE – 5

Values of T_3/B_3 for $f = 50, y = 5$ (with varying x, I)					
I	$x = 0$	$x = 25$	$x = 50$	$x = 75$	$x = 100$
0.00	1.0410	1.0410	1.0410	1.0410	1.0410
0.25	1.0942	1.0691	1.0445	1.0206	0.9972
0.50	1.1532	1.0995	1.0483	0.9996	0.9531
0.75	1.2190	1.1324	1.0523	0.9780	0.9089
1.00	1.2926	1.1681	1.0565	0.9558	0.8644
1.25	1.3758	1.2072	1.0609	0.9328	0.8198
1.50	1.4704	1.2499	1.0656	0.9092	0.7749
1.75	1.5789	1.2970	1.0706	0.8849	0.7297
2.00	1.7048	1.3490	1.0760	0.8598	0.6844
2.25	1.8524	1.4068	1.0817	0.8339	0.6388

Tables – 4, 5, 6 show that, for $x = 0, 25, 50$, the ratio T_3/B_3 increases as I increases. This ratio decreases as I increases, for $x = 75, 100$. If the ratio $T_3/B_3 > 1$, AITC has greater vote share in comparison to BJP and, if $T_3/B_3 < 1$, BJP has greater vote share than AITC.

TABLE – 6

Values of T_3/B_3 for $f = 50, y = 10$ (with varying x, I)					
I	$x = 0$	$x = 25$	$x = 50$	$x = 75$	$x = 100$
0.00	0.9197	0.9197	0.9197	0.9197	0.9197
0.25	0.9634	0.9426	0.9223	0.9024	0.8828
0.50	1.0115	0.9673	0.9250	0.8845	0.8457
0.75	1.0647	0.9939	0.9279	0.8661	0.8081
1.00	1.1237	1.0227	0.9309	0.8471	0.7703
1.25	1.1897	1.0540	0.9342	0.8275	0.7320
1.50	1.2639	1.0881	0.9376	0.8073	0.6935
1.75	1.3480	1.1253	0.9412	0.7864	0.6545
2.00	1.4440	1.1662	0.9450	0.7648	0.6152

2.25	1.5548	1.2112	0.9491	0.7425	0.5755
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Let us choose two extreme cases (or possibilities) from Table-1, which are, Case-1: $f = 10$ & $x = 72.66$, Case-2: $f = 100$ & $x = 7.27$. Under what condition upon I , one gets $T_3/B_3 < 1$, for zero vote swing percentage (i.e., $y = 0$)? Calculations based on equations (11) – (13) show that this is not possible for any physically meaningful range of I . For Case-1, one gets $I > 9.524$ as the condition, which is physically impossible since I , which denotes the number of ineligible voters deleted (in crores), far exceeds the total electorate (nearly 6.8 crores) of the state. For Case-2, one gets $I < -0.506$, which is physically inadmissible since I represents the number of deleted ineligible voters and therefore cannot be negative. The above conclusions correspond specifically to the limiting case $y = 0$. For nonzero anti-incumbency swing ($y > 0$), feasible ranges of I may emerge depending on the values of f and x .

LIMITATIONS: The present study is subject to the following limitations, arising from the assumptions made for simplicity: 1) It has been assumed that the votes cast by the ineligible voters in West Bengal in the 2024 Lok Sabha Election were all in favour of the two main parties (AITC & BJP). 2) The number of ineligible voters has been assumed to be proportional to the total number of registered voters during any election, based on which we estimated their number in West Bengal in the 2024 Lok Sabha election using the number obtained through the SIR conducted in 2026. 3) It has been assumed that the percentages of votes that have shifted from AITC and Others to BJP, due to anti-incumbency, are the same. 4) Constituency-wise or booth-level data have not been used for analysis, and thus one may refer to this formulation as a *single-constituency model*, treating West Bengal as one electorate for vote-share analysis.

4. Concluding Remarks

This study presents a simple mathematical model to assess the potential impact of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls on the vote shares of the major political parties in the 2026 West Bengal Assembly Election. Using the results of the 2024 Lok Sabha Election as the baseline, the model examines how the deletion of nearly 0.91 crore ineligible voters, along with voter turnout and anti-incumbency effects, may have influenced the final results.

The analysis shows that the observed vote shares in the 2026 election (AITC: 40.80%, BJP: 45.84%, and Others: 13.36%) are consistent with the model under various combinations of turnout and voting preferences of the deleted voters in the 2024 Lok Sabha Election in West Bengal. For the hypothetical case in which the SIR had not been conducted, i.e., $I = 0$, the model suggests that AITC would have secured a higher vote share than BJP in 2026 if the anti-incumbency swing remained below 6.61% approximately. The present study further suggests that, for the observed 2026 election outcome to be reproduced this model, when the number of deleted voters is taken as 0.91 crore, i.e., $I = 0.91$, the anti-incumbency swing from AITC and Others to BJP must be at least about 6.8%.

Different combinations of parameter values have been used to find the vote shares, to examine the sensitivity of the possible outcomes to the parameters. The results indicate that electoral roll revisions can have a noticeable effect on vote shares in closely contested elections.

However, the findings depend on the assumptions made in the model, such as proportional distribution of ineligible voters and uniform application of the anti-incumbency factor.

A limitation of this study is that it uses aggregate state-wide data. This model can be improved significantly if constituency-wise or booth-level data are used. Further studies incorporating more detailed data at the constituency level would provide deeper insights into these dynamics. Beyond West Bengal, the present model may serve as a useful framework for analysing the possible impact of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) on vote shares in other Indian states where such revisions have been conducted.

This analysis highlights how electoral roll revisions and related administrative processes may influence electoral outcomes, underscoring the importance of further quantitative and political analyses of electoral reforms, party competition, and voter-list revision mechanisms in Indian democracy [21-23].

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